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EDITORIAL
Transnational Dimensions of Climate
Governance
1. climate change as an arena of
transnational environmental law
It is ﬁtting that the second issue of Transnational Environmental Law (TEL) focuses on
governance and climate change. Transnational environmental law views governance
as an outgrowth of local, regional and transboundary communications and pressures.
The challenges of transnational governance – and its necessity – are especially clear in the
context of climate change. On the one hand, climate change is a global phenomenonwith
globally distributed causes, thus requiring a global response. On the other hand, emis-
sions always take place from speciﬁc locations within particular jurisdictions, and the
impacts of climate change will vary from place to place, requiring diverse adaptation
measures. Thus, it is inherent in the nature of climate change that responses will
be multi-scalar and multi-jurisdictional, raising profound issues of governance.
Moreover, because of the ubiquity of climate and of the activities causing emissions,
climate governance modiﬁes rules that govern private control over resources – in other
words, with the property system.
The articles in this issue examine a broad range of issues relating to governance, but
they can be divided into two general themes. The ﬁrst theme relates to the internal
structure of climate governance. Responses to climate change involve a complex interplay
between different geographic jurisdictions (horizontal governance issues) and interplay
between different tiers of governance (vertical governance issues). At times, vertical and
horizontal linkages collide – for example, when disputes between contesting geographic
authorities are referred to a higher-level authority, resulting in a vertical resolution of a
horizontal dispute in what could be called a ‘triangular’ relationship. Considering the
whole structure of sometimes synergistic and sometimes competing authorities,we perceive
the emerging contours of an expanding and still evolving network of governance.
The second theme in the issue is the interplay between public and private modes of
resource control – or between governance and property. Climate governancemay restrict
property use in some ways, while creating new forms of property in others. For instance,
emissions allowances may be considered a new form of property. However, the entitle-
ments are constrained and limited in some ways that we traditionally do not associate
with the concept of property. Meanwhile, sea level rise as a result of climate change
threatens coastal areas.Does this impact upon property rights in the affected areas?Aswe
will see, these are questions with which scholars and legal systems are still struggling.
2. the internal structure of climate governance
Since climate change is a global problem, one might expect that the keystone of climate
policy would be a binding global agreement to control emissions. Global cooperation
in some form is undoubtedly required.1 But negotiating a global agreement has proved
to be no easy matter, some halting steps forward notwithstanding. Pending effective
global agreement, climate mitigation is dispersed over an almost bewildering number of
lower levels of governance.
Even within a single jurisdiction, mitigation efforts can take place at various levels of
government. In the United States (US), for instance, state governments have actively
engaged with the issue of climate change.2 By 2006, every state had taken certain steps to
address climate change,3 such as the adoption of renewable portfolio standards (RPSs),
which require that a percentage of retail electricity sales be derived from renewable
sources.4 Exemplifying its leadership on climate issues, California’s RPS has an especially
ambitious 33 per cent target by 2020.5
California also mandated the very ﬁrst inventory of in-state greenhouse gas emis-
sions in 1998.6 Eight years later, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the California Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32),7 which requires California to reduce emissions
to the 1990 level by 2020.8 The signiﬁcance of transnational communication is illustrated
by a statement by former British PrimeMinister Tony Blair that its signing represented a
‘historic day for the rest of the world as well’.9 Blair and Schwarzenegger also entered
into an agreement to share best practices on market-based systems and to cooperate to
investigate new technologies; similar agreements now exist between California and states
1 See, e.g., K.H. Engel & S.R. Saleska, ‘The Case of Climate Change’ (2005) 32 Ecology Law Quarterly,
pp. 183–233, at 187.
2 State efforts are described in E. Stein, ‘Regional Initiatives to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions’, in
M.B. Gerrard, Global Climate Change and U.S. Law (American Bar Association, 2007), pp. 315–42;
D. Hodas, ‘State Initiatives’, in Gerrard, ibid., pp. 343–70. A survey of state efforts can be found in Pace
Law School Center for Environmental Legal Studies, ‘The State Response to Climate Change: 50–State
Survey’, in Gerrard, ibid., pp. 371–420.
3 Hodas, ibid., at p. 343; E.C. Schlanger, K.H. Engel & S. Rider, Navigating Climate Change Policy:
The Opportunities of Federalism (University of Arizona Press, 2011) provides a collection of thoughtful
evaluations of this trend.
4 M.B. Gerrard, ‘Introduction’, in Gerrard, n. 2 above, pp. 1–27, at 22.
5 California Air Resources Board (CARB), ‘RPS Program Overview’, available at: http://www.cpuc.ca.
gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/overview.
6 AB 4420 (Sher), Chapter 1506, Statutes of 1988.
7 AB 32 (Nunez), Chapter 488, California Statutes of 2006, codiﬁed at Cal. Health & Safety Code
x 38500 et seq.
8 E. Chemerinsky et al., ‘California, Climate Change, and the Constitution’ (2007) 37Environmental Law
Reporter, pp. 10053–67, at 10053.
9 Ibid., at p. 10054.
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and provinces in Australia and Canada.10 Interestingly, Australian states were also in the
forefront in addressing climate change prior to national action.11
The European Union (EU) has been a particularly energetic sub-global actor. The EU
began operating the world’s ﬁrst mandatory carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions trading
scheme in January 2005,12 and has since continued to develop an extensive package of
climate change mitigation measures.13
Developing countries, too, are beginning to take action. China’s 12th ﬁve-year plan,
which covers 2011–2015, now includes a 17 per cent reduction in energy intensity
and a 10 per cent increase in the share of energy produced by renewables and nuclear.14
The plan establishes a longer-term goal of establishing a carbon trading market.15
China has also announced that it is ‘willing to bear the obligations of a legally binding
commitment’, provided such a commitment is ‘matched with China’s economic devel-
opment and capabilities based on the principles of common but differentiated respons-
ibilities, fairness and environmental integrity’.16
In sum, climate change is an international problem, but it is not – or certainly not
exclusively – tackled in the conventional way of unitary national actors cooperating
through formal treaties. The sprawling range of national, regional and sub-national
climate change efforts, requiring the involvement of an unprecedentedly large array of
governmental authorities, deﬁes traditional notions of international cooperation and
cries out for theoretical clariﬁcation.
In their article on multi-level governance, Jacqueline Peel, Lee Godden and
Rodney Keenan provide a framework for understanding this new form of network
governance. They analyze case studies that include emissions trading systems, the
REDD mechanism (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
in Developing Countries), climate litigation, adaptation and decentralization within
federal systems.17 Peel, Godden and Keenan see weaknesses in relying on either a
top-down or bottom-up approach. Instead, they advocate a multi-level governance
approach, based on a recognition that ‘trends toward fragmentation, decentralization
and grassroots empowerment are producing a more “kaleidoscopic” world consisting
of a “multi-layered system” of activity undertaken by states, international institutions,
the private sector and non-governmental organizations’.18
10 Ibid., at p. 10059.
11 J. Peel, L. Godden&R. Keenan, ‘Climate Change Law in an Era ofMulti-Level Governance’ (2012) 1(2)
Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 245–80, at 277.
12 See European Commission, Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) website at: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/ets/index_en.htm.
13 K. Kulovesi, E. Morgera & M. Muñoz, ‘Environmental Integration and Multi-Faceted International
Dimensions of EU Law: Unpacking the EU’s 2009 Climate and Energy Package’ (2011) 48(3) Common
Market Law Review, pp. 829–91, at 830.
14 J. Lewis, Energy and Climate Goals of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
2011), available at: http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/energy-climate-goals-china-twelfth-ﬁve-year-plan.pdf.
15 Ibid., p. 2.
16 ‘China Sets Conditions on Binding Climate Change Commitment after 2020’, Xinhua English News,
6 Dec. 2011, available at: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2011-12/06/c_131290906.htm.
17 Peel et al., n. 11 above.
18 Ibid., at p. 251.
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The fragmentation and lack of universality of these mechanisms invite friction
between jurisdictions. A contribution by Luca Rubini and Ingrid Jegou19 considers
some of the ‘triangular’ issues raised by climate mitigation, where conﬂicting horizontal
authorities may seek resolution from a higher-level institution. Their article analyzes
whether World Trade Organization (WTO) law requires that emissions allowances
be auctioned rather than distributed without charge. Advocates of free distribution
of emissions allowances often invoke a combination of feasibility- and fairness-based
arguments, claiming that the sudden imposition of a substantial extra cost on industry
would be economically disruptive, and that it would excessively penalize ﬁrms for the
side-effects of socially highly beneﬁcial production. But these arguments are not without
controversy. Others argue, along with Rubini and Jegou, that allowances should
be auctioned.20 Their article defends the position that large-scale free distribution is
unsound from an economic perspective, and questionable from a legal perspective, since
it might be seen to constitute an unlawful subsidy under the WTO. Any provisions
introduced into international trade law to exempt the free distribution of allowances
from the application of the law on subsidies, they argue, should be narrowly construed
and temporary.
The WTO will also need to address efforts to expand the scope of trading systems to
include transportation or imported goods. The EU has brought international ﬂights
within its trading system, requiring allowances or offsets for all emissions during a
ﬂight (both inside and outside European air space).21 The EUhas indicated that itwould
back down if an international agreement on airline emissions were in store.22 In the
meantime, however, there is a serious question mark over the compatibility of the EU’s
actions with international trade law, and international law generally.
In her contribution to this issue,23 AnHertogen argues that the EU action should be
considered lawful. The objection to the EU action is that it extends EU jurisdiction
beyond its borders by regulating emissions from the airlines of other nations that take
place outside EU airspace. Hertogen argues, however, that a contemporary under-
standing of sovereignty should take into account the right to prevent harms from
occurring within the state in question, even if the harms are caused by actions elsewhere.
To gauge the lawfulness of its unilateral action, the harm to the EU from emissions must
be balanced against the intrusion on the sovereignty of other states as a result of the EU
regulation. Hertogen argues that, in this instance, the scales point in favour of the EU, all
19 L. Rubini & I. Jegou, ‘Who’ll Stop the Rain? Allocating Emissions Allowances for Free: Environmental
Policy, Economics, and WTO Subsidy Law’ (2012) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 325–54.
20 See D. Farber, ‘PollutionMarkets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade’ (2012) 39
Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 19–26.
21 See J. Meltzer, ‘Climate Change and Trade: The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO’ (2012) 15(1)
Journal of International Economic Law, pp. 111–56 (questioning whether the Directive complies with
WTO requirements).
22 See D. Pruzin, ‘Ofﬁcial says EUwill not Suspend Inclusion of Airlines in Trading Plan as Talks Continue’,
Environmental Reporter, 3 Mar. 2012, p. 742, available at: http://news.bna.com/erln.
23 A.Hertogen, ‘Sovereignty as Decisional Independence over Domestic Affairs: The Dispute over Aviation in
the EU Emissions Trading System’ (2010) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 281–301.
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the more so since allowing the EU to act unilaterally in this context can help to solve the
collective action problem of entering into a global agreement on aviation emissions.
The discussion so far has focused on climate governance in connection with miti-
gation, but adaptation also raises signiﬁcant governance challenges. We are witnessing
increased efforts to develop roadmaps for responding to adaptation governance
challenges in both the developed and developing world.24 But, apart from recognizing
the growing urgency of adaptation actions and the inherently transnational nature of the
challenge, the legal literature has not yet clariﬁed how to ﬁll the governance gaps.25
Adaptation issues arise in many contexts, but perhaps most clearly and predictably
in coastal areas. Sea level rise is one of the most predictable effects of climate change.26
This will result in loss of coastal lands,27 inundation of some estuary systems with salt
water, salt water intrusions into some drinking sources, and increased exposure to ﬂood
damage.28
Coastal areas around the world will be faced with the need to adapt to these
changes. In their contribution to this issue, Jonathan Verschuuren and Jan McDonald
investigate the legal frameworks for coastal adaptation in developed countries.29
Adaptation is a multifaceted enterprise, as demonstrated by the article’s analysis of
international, EU and domestic regimes. Although the EU addresses adaptation in
the contexts of river basin planning and coastal zone management, Verschuuren and
McDonald’s case studies of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK) demonstrate
that, even within the EU, Member States take very different approaches to sea level rise,
with varying degrees of centralized competence and coordination. As a non-EU case study,
the authors examineAustralia, where planning is evenmore decentralized andwhere local
authorities have required prompting from the courts. Thus, there is as yet no consensus on
the ‘federalism’ issue in climate governance – that is, on what levels of government should
be involved and how they should coordinate.
24 See UNFCCC, ‘Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries’
(2007), available at: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/impacts.pdf (noting the particular
vulnerabilities of developing countries to climate change).
25 See, e.g., V. Flatt, ‘Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to Climate Change
Adaptation’ (2012) 64(1) Florida Law Review, pp. 269–93; H. Doremus, ‘Adaptive Management as an
Information Problem’ (2011) 89 North Carolina Law Review, pp. 1455–95; R. Kundis Craig,
‘“Stationarity is Dead” – Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for Climate Change Adaptation
Law’ (2010) 34(1) Harvard Environmental Law Review, pp. 9–73; R.L. Glicksman, ‘Climate Change
Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations’ (2010) 40(4) Environmental
Law, pp. 1159–93, at 1159; A.E. Camacho, ‘Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure’ (2009) 59(1) Emory Law Journal, pp. 1–78, at 26–7.
26 See, e.g., K. Hasselman et al., ‘The Challenge of Long-Term Climate Change’ (2003) 302(5652) Science,
pp. 1923–5, at 1924 (Figure 2) (predicting a two metre increase in sea level under a ‘business as usual’
scenario by 2100; but only 20 centimetres under an optimum regulatory strategy).
27 A.B. Pittock, Climate Change: Turning Up the Heat (Routledge, 2005) gives examples, including China
at p. 264, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh at p. 268, and the United States at p. 278.
28 See E. Kolbert, Field Notes from a Catastrophe: Man, Nature, and Climate Change (Bloomsbury, 2006),
pp. 223–4 (British governmental study indicating that what are now hundred-year ﬂoods could become
routine by late in this century); see also Pittock, ibid., p. 118 (stating that, without adaptive measures,
annual ﬂood losses would increase from ₤1–24 billion in different scenarios).
29 J. Verschuuren & J. McDonald, ‘Towards a Legal Framework for Coastal Adaptation: Assessing the
First Steps in Europe and Australia (2012) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 355–79.
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More generally, adaptation governance presents many unresolved issues. Peel,
Godden and Keenan point out that that the ‘roles and responsibilities of different
levels of government and different sectors in society in relation to adaptation are not
clearly deﬁned and there is a varying understanding of the needs, priorities and
mechanisms for adaptation in different parts of government, across industry sectors
and within the broader community’.30We clearly need much more thought about how
current adaptation efforts are arranged and how future efforts can be organized more
effectively. Transnational environmental law will be at the heart of these efforts.
3. the public–private interface
We now turn to the way in which governance affects private arrangements regarding
resource use. The legal system divides control over resources through governance
rules, directives to private parties, and decisions by private parties about resource use.
Governance structures may serve intrinsic values such as public participation, but
their fundamental purpose is to modify behaviour, often of private parties. In the context
of environmental law, the changes involve the use of resources such as air, water and
land. A web of land use regulations, property laws and contractual arrangements already
govern these resources. For instance, property rules designate what actors have control
over what resources, whether the resource is land, air or water. Climate governance will
reshape existing patterns of control. New property rights may come into existence while
old ones may be modiﬁed.
Climate governance can augment existing rights, creating the opportunity for new
types of private ordering. Climate mitigation schemes create a variety of property-like
instruments, which form part of a larger set of what could be called environmental
property rights (EPRs). In an emissions trading system, emissions allowances permit
a ﬁrm that reduces its emissions to proﬁt by selling its allowance.31Once the pollution
permits have been allocated initially, they are transferable, and sale prices function as
free-market equivalents of pollution taxes. The permits have value because emissions
are subject to an overall cap.
Another common form of EPR involves offsets or mitigation credits. Greenhouse gas
offsets, also commonly called carbon offsets, allow an emitter to meet the requirements
of a cap-and-trade scheme by purchasing a carbon reduction by a third-party who is
outside the trading system. These offsets could take the form of reduced emissions
in the US or perhaps elsewhere, such as the substitution of a natural gas electricity
generator for a coal-ﬁred generator in China. Alternatively, they could involve the
30 Peel et al., n. 11 above, at p. 274.
31 For conceptual overviews, see R.W. Hahn& G.L. Hester, ‘Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and
Practice’ (1989)16 Ecology Law Quarterly, pp. 361–406. A related concept is the use of transferable
ﬁshing quotas to help maintain sustainable ﬁsh stocks. See D. Dana, ‘Overcoming the Political Tragedy
of the Commons: Lessons Learned from the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act’ (1997) 24 Ecology
Law Quarterly, pp. 833–46; K.M. Fletcher, ‘When Economics and Conservation Clash: Challenges to
Economic Analysis in Fisheries Management’ (2001) 31 Environmental Law Reporter, pp. 11168–73.
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creation of additional carbon sinks, such as planting trees.32 Unlike emissions allow-
ances, greenhouse gas offsets come from sources or sinks that are not otherwise subject
to regulatory requirements because they are in unregulated sectors or are outside the
regulating jurisdiction.
Putting aside legal technicalities, it seems natural to connect EPRs with the concept
of property. For example, it would be very natural to say that a company ‘owns’
carbon allowances or credits in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM).33 Carbon allowances can be bought and sold in markets, which makes them
seem as much like property as government bonds or ﬁnancial derivatives. But whether
EPRs such as carbon allowances should be considered a form of property legally may
depend on the context. In particular, designers of a trading system should consider
whether to elevate allowances to the status of property for constitutional purposes.
SabinaManea’s article addresses this issue in the context of EU emissions allowances.34
Controversy has arisen, for instance, in a UK case involving amothballed plant, where the
issue was whether the unused allowances could be placed into a trust.35 AsManea points
out, US trading systems usually specify that emissions allowances can be modiﬁed at any
time and are not considered as property interests. The advantage of this approach is that it
preserves ﬂexibility, but the disadvantage is that it may reduce conﬁdence in themarket for
allowances.
In seeking to classify emissions allowances, Manea considers possible analogies with
intellectual property rights, broadcast spectrum rights and milk quotas. Although this
comparison is not of a nature to generate a deﬁnitive conclusion as to the status of the EU
allowances, Manea’s analysis does highlight overlaps and divergences between various
rights regimes, which can be instructive in developing a richer understanding of emissions
entitlements as property.Her contribution calls for further research into howbest to deﬁne
emissions entitlements.
Manea’s article connects in interesting ways with the work of Rubini and Jegou on
the question of whether free allowances constitute a forbidden subsidy under the WTO.
One category of subsidies involves the free provision of goods or services to ﬁrms.
Rubini and Jegou argue that allocation of emissions allowances could be considered as
the provision of a good, since the allowances are tradable and have economic value.36
As Manea indicates, there is some basis for this argument but, when it comes to
emissions allowances, economic value and tradability are complex matters.
Property rights also enter into climate governance in another way. Sea level rise will
expose coastal lands as well as others to ﬂood risks. As the article by Verschuuren and
32 See N. Richardson, International Greenhouse Gas Offsets under the Clean Air Act’, Resources for the
Future (RFF) Discussion Paper 10–24, 2010, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id51586037.
33 See http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php.
34 S. Manea, ‘Deﬁning Emissions Entitlements in the Constitution of the EU Emissions Trading System’
(2012) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 303–23.
35 Armstrong DLW GmbH v.Winnington Networks Ltd [2012] EWHC 10 (High Court of England and
Wales).
36 Rubini & Jegou, n. 19 above, at p. 337.
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McDonald indicates, climate adaptation often involves some efforts to restrict or even
roll back development in areas at risk. Landowners are likely to challenge such
restrictions as derogations from their property rights, particularly if they purchased the
land prior to public awareness of the effects of sea level rise.
While those claims involve clearly established legal rights in land, climate policy may
prompt calls to newly recognize certain types of ownership right. In an examination of
the operation of the REDD1 mechanism in Mozambique,37 Grit Ludwig raises the
question of how to protect the rights of indigenous peoples and local communities. Given
incomplete titling or deﬁnition of property rights, along with political obstacles, such
communities may be unable to have an effective voice in the management of the forest
lands on which they depend. In Mozambique, for instance, title to land remains in the
state, with private entities receiving only a usage right that can be inherited but is not
transferrable. Local communities have some right to use forest resources for subsidence;
in the face of commercial development, however, they are entitled only to notice of
development projects, and they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to access forests for commercial use
because of the onerous licensing procedures. Thus, they are poorly positioned to defend
their property and participation rights.
Ludwig views this as a widespread problem for many local communities and indig-
enous peoples living in forests worldwide.38 In the absence of efforts to strengthen their
property rights, she argues, these communities may lose control of their lands, fail to
beneﬁt from REDD, and even ﬁnd themselves faced with restricted access and physical
displacement.39 REDD itself may suffer from the absence of the beneﬁts associated with
community involvement in forest preservation.
The issue of community participation in REDD decisions can be viewed as one of
property law, as Ludwig does. But it can also be considered as an issue of resource
governance that would be important regardless of property rules. Governance rules
in public law serve the same function as property rules in private law: they allocate
the power to make decisions about resource use.
Property issues illustrate the ways in which climate change will affect interactions
between private parties and aspects of law that are not explicitly ‘environmental’.
Climate is, after all, a pervasive aspect of life, and climate change is closely connected
with the crucial energy, land use and food production systems. There is every reason
to expect continued evolution in the legal rules governing these linked systems. That
evolution will provide fruitful ground for developing transnational environmental
legal analysis.
We are only a few decades into the era of overt climate change. Until we have
transitioned into a zero-carbon society, we will continue to have a need to control
conventional energy and land use conversion. Eventually, the governance system
required to do so may shake down into a clear, organized structure. In the meantime,
37 G. Ludwig, ‘Property Rights and Participation in REDD1: The Case of Mozambique’ (2012) 1(2)
Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 381–401.
38 Ibid., at p. 398.
39 Ibid., at p. 383.
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transnational climate governance will continue to involve messy vertical, horizontal, and
triangular relationships. Legal scholars will ﬁnd much to occupy them as they attempt to
rationalize and critique this evolving transnational system. The articles in this issue make
an essential contribution to this goal by mapping out some of the contours of our future
governance systems. It will take many years to ﬁll in the details.
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